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Abstract We investigate the impact of the Romanian and Czech family policy systems on
the poverty risk of families with children. We focus on separating out the effects of policy
design itself and size of benefits from the interaction between policies and population
characteristics. We find that interactions between population characteristics, the wider tax
benefit system and child related policies are pervasive and large. Both population char-
acteristics and the wider tax-benefit environment can dramatically alter the antipoverty
effect of a given set of policies.
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1 Introduction
The past 20 years have witnessed prominent policy initiatives to tackle child poverty both
at the European and national levels (for example, the Lisbon strategy or the Labour
government pledge to halve child poverty in the UK by 2020). However, despite these
efforts, child poverty rates have remained stubbornly high. Even more worryingly, they
have increased in some countries especially in comparison with overall poverty rates
(Oxley et al. 2000; Van Mechelen and Bradshaw 2013). For example, between 2005 and
2012, poverty among children in the 27 Member States has broadly remained stable around
28 % whereas poverty among the population as a whole fell from 26 to 25 %
(EUROSTAT).
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A large body of scholarly work has linked poverty, and low income in general, to
deleterious consequences on child developmental trajectories and educational attainment
(Black et al. 2000; Engle and Black 2008; Najman et al. 2009; Petterson and Burke Albers
2001), health status (Aber et al. 1997; Case et al. 2002), as well as adulthood outcomes
(Duncan et al. 1998, 2010).
Given the consequences of material deprivation both on current well-being and future
capability and the fact that children generally have little control over what economic
resources are available to them, there is overwhelming agreement that child poverty is an
area necessitating public intervention. To mitigate child poverty, governments can resort,
among other tools, to various forms of income support and child contingent transfers.
Previous scholarly work has found considerable evidence that child contingent transfers
do have a substantial effect on child poverty outcomes, with typically large cross-national
variation in policy effects (Matsaganis et al. 2007; Barrientos and DeJong 2006; Bradshaw
2006; Immervoll et al. 2000; Whiteford and Adema 2007). These studies usually use either
pre-transfer post-transfer comparisons or a microsimulation-based approach and attribute
any differences in observed poverty or inequality indicators to the policy package they
investigate. One aspect left unaddressed in these studies is the extent to which policy
effects are shaped by ‘outside’ factors, i.e. population characteristics and/or the wider tax-
benefit system in which they operate. Although these studies generally acknowledge the
existence of interactions of various sorts and their potential in shaping the impact of family
transfers, they fail to explicitly investigate these issues. As a result, there is little evidence
on the sensitivity of estimated policy effects to variation in the population profile and the
design of other social and fiscal instruments that are present. For example, can these factors
alter the ranking of policy instruments with similar objectives? These issues are all the
more important as the European Union (EU) has launched various benchmarking exercises
that essentially rely on comparisons between countries with potentially very different
demographic, labour market and tax-benefit institutions.
This paper seeks to bridge this gap and contribute to the understanding of the role of
interactions between child contingent policies, population characteristics and the wider tax
benefit system in shaping the impact of the former on child poverty. By interactions, we
mean that the magnitude of the policy effect is itself contingent on other factors, in
particular population characteristics and/or the architecture of the wider tax-benefit system.
To this end, we take Romania and the Czech Republic as case studies and examine the
reduction in child poverty effected by three family transfers and one tax concession (see
Table 1). Romania is a country with high levels of child poverty where the support package
available to families with children has been found to be not very effective (TARKI 2010).
In contrast, the Czech Republic registers low overall and child poverty rates which have
been found to be at least partly the result of generous income support (TARKI 2010).
Using microsimulation techniques, we examine to what extent these results are driven by
the characteristics of the child-related policy instruments themselves as opposed to being
the product of the ‘fit’ between these instruments, other income support measures available
to families with children and population features. More specifically, we compute the direct,
first-order effect of both the Romanian and the Czech child policy package on relative
poverty, while varying the underlying population characteristics and the wider tax-benefit
system. Following Salanauskaite and Verbist (2013), we also distinguish between instru-
ment generosity and instrument design in measuring the impact of a given child policy
package. The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature
on the links between child related transfers and child poverty. Section 3 describes the
Romanian and Czech policies we consider in this exercise. Section 4 describes the data and
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Table 1 Policy instruments included in the child package
Policy Eligibility Amounts % Of
children in
families
receivinga
Average
amount
as % of
HH
disposable
incomeb
Romania
Allowance for
new born
children and the
outfit for new
born children
Universal entitlement for
all new-borns
Lump sum of approx. 354
RON
6 2
Universal child
benefit
Age\18 or in high
school
Per month/200 RON for
children under 2; 25
RON for children 2 and
older
100 7
Means-tested
family benefits
Means-tested; monthly
income\176 RON per
person; children are
persons\16 or\18 and
with family income\50
RON/month
Between 36 and 52
RON/month, depending
on the number of
children for 2 parent
families and between 52
and 79 RON per month
for single parent
families
40 9
Tax allowance for
dependent
children
All employed parents
with employment
income below 3000
RON/month; the tax
allowance is only
deductible against
employment income;
children are considered
dependent if aged\16
or having an income
below 250 RON/month
Maximum 100 RON per
child, max 400
RON/month. The tax
allowance is reduced on
a sliding scale between
1000 and 3000 RON per
month; it reduces to
zero once gross
employment income
reaches 3000
RON/month
69 2
Czech Republic
Child allowance Means-tested; family
income is\4 times the
family minimum living
standard level; children
are individuals younger
than 18 or younger than
26 and in education
Between 16–36 % of the
child’s minimum living
standard (which
depends on age),
depending on family
income
74 3
Social allowance Means-tested; income is
\2.2 times the family
minimum living
standard; children are
individuals younger
than 18 or younger than
26 and in education
Child’s minimum living
standard from which a
share may be deducted
based on the size of
family income relative
the family’s minimum
living standard level
27 6
Birth grant Universal entitlement for
all new-borns
Lump sum between
17,760 and 79,680
CZK, depending on
number of children in
the family
9 5
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methods. The various counterfactual scenarios we simulate are explained in Sect. 5.
Section 6 discusses our main results. Section 7 concludes.
2 Child Poverty and Public Transfers: A Review of the Literature
There is a long literature trying to evaluate the role of social and fiscal policies on the welfare of
families with children (Gornick and Ja¨ntti 2010, 2011; Ja¨ntti and Bradbury 2003; Barrientos and
DeJong 2006; Figari et al. 2011;Whiteford and Adema 2007; Oxley et al. 2000; Sutherland and
Piachaud2011;Bradbury and Ja¨ntti 2001). These studies usually compare poverty and inequality
indicators based on market incomes alone with the same indicators derived based on disposable
incomes and find that taxes and transfers play an important role in reducing poverty among
families with children, although there is considerable cross-national variation in the extent of this
reduction. For example, examining child poverty rates among high income countries, Gornick
and Ja¨ntti (2010, 2011) conclude that cross-national variation is explained not so much by
demographic factors as by labour market institutions alongside the existing system of transfers.
Similar exercises have been carried out using child related policies (Van Mechelen and
Bradshaw 2013; Matsaganis et al. 2007; Fo¨rster and To´th 2001; Immervoll et al. 2000;
Bradshaw 2006). Generally, these studies find that transfers targeted at families with
children significantly reduce both the prevalence and the depth of child poverty, albeit the
size of the reduction varies substantially across countries.
Studies directly looking at infant outcomes such as birth weight and neonatalmortality rates
also find positive effects of income support availability to disadvantaged women and parents
(Hoynes et al. 2011; Almond et al. 2011). Finally, the availability of income support has been
found to positively affect not only outcomes measured during childhood but also long run
outcomes such as health and economic self-sufficiency in adulthood (Hoynes et al. 2012).
Although there is general consensus that directing resources to low income families
with children is a good way to invest in the next generation, there is less agreement on what
Table 1 continued
Policy Eligibility Amounts % Of
children in
families
receivinga
Average
amount
as % of
HH
disposable
incomeb
Refundable child
tax credit
Universal entitlement for
all parents with
dependent children; the
tax credit is only
refundable if
employment income is
larger or equal to 6
minimum wages/year
6000 KCZK/month per
child, up to a maximum
of 5 children
90 3
Children are considered to be individuals aged 17 or less; all policies refer to 2007
Source: Authors’ compilation based on EUROMOD G1.4
a Percentages calculated based on simulated entitlements in EUROMOD, not on actual reported receipt in
SILC
b Figures calculated based on households receiving only; in the case of tax concessions, figures are based on
approximations not exact amounts
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aspects make a policy more effective. Some authors stress the size of the transfer package
(Notten and Gassman 2008; TARKI 2010). According to this view, it is mainly the gen-
erosity of the transfer system towards families with children that is likely to impact on
child poverty rates. However, public child contingent support is rarely equally generous
towards all families with children. Explicitly or implicitly, policy instruments are likely to
favour families with some characteristics and not others (ex: number and age of children,
number of adults/earners in the household, family income, tax-paying status etc.). Clearly,
the effect of a given set of policies on child poverty depends to a large extent on the
demographic and labour market characteristics of poor families.
A different strand in the field has argued that in addition to size, policy design plays an
important role in determining policy effectiveness (Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013; Levy
et al. 2009; Immervoll et al. 2000). Generally, these studies have relied on cross-national
comparisons, and/or microsimulation methods to measure the impact of policies, as well as
to estimate the effect of alternative policy designs. Although providing important insights
into the importance of policy design, these studies usually stop at concluding that one set of
policies would likely have been more effective than another in a particular context. There
is little potential to generalize what features of the design are likely to make a policy more
effective than another. More importantly, they fail to consider the sensitivity of the results
to the demographic and wider institutional context they have been derived from.
Finally, a large body of the literature has focused on the role of targeting transfers in
general and family benefits in particular in addressing poverty (Atkinson 1995; Jarvis and
Micklewright 1995; de Neubourg et al. 2007; Fo¨rster and To´th 2001). While some authors
(Nelson 2004; Korpi and Palme 1998) have found evidence of a negative correlation
between targeting and the overall budget available for public transfers (the famous
redistribution paradox), it is not clear that this relationship holds when child related
policies are concerned. On the contrary, countries that combined universal benefits with
targeted support for low income families with children appeared to achieve superior
poverty reduction (Van Mechelen and Bradshaw 2013).
To sum up, extensive research in the area of child poverty consistently finds that public
transfers can play an important role in shaping poverty outcomes for families with children.
Nonetheless, we still understand relatively little about which aspects of transfer policies,
beyond size, matter most and how these interact with demographic characteristics and the
wider fiscal institutional context in which they operate. This paper begins to address this
gap by examining the extent to which policy impacts are shaped by the characteristics of
the population they apply to and the tax-benefit system within which they operate. We
address two questions. First, we assess the variation in estimated policy effects when the
context, i.e. population characteristics and/or the tax benefit system, changes. Can the same
set of policies produce very different estimates when the context is altered? Second, we
probe whether the ranking of policy instruments is context specific. For example, is it
possible that one set of policies is more effective in the context of the Romanian population
but a different set of policies is most effective in the context of the Czech population?
3 Child Poverty and Child Support in Romania and the Czech Republic
From a historical perspective, Romania and the Czech Republic share a number of simi-
larities. Both countries have experienced during half a century a foreign-imposed regime
based on a command economy combined with suppression of political and civil freedoms.
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During the nineties, both countries have undergone an extensive political and economic
transition that ended with becoming full members of the European Union in 2004 and 2007
respectively. Despite these similarities, the two countries differ in a number of important
respects. In particular, the Czech Republic is much richer with a GDP/capita in 2012 of
approximately 20,700 PPP compared to Romania’s 13,500 PPP (EUROSTAT). It is also a
country with less inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient (25 vs. 33, EUROSTAT).
Most importantly, for our purposes, the two countries rank very differently on child
poverty indicators (see Fig. 1). While in the Czech Repulic poverty rates for chidlren are
relatively low in comparative perspective, Romania is one of the EU Member States with
the highest prevalence of child poverty. Finally, the Czech Republic has slightly higher
levels of taxation compared to Romania (40 % of GDP is collected in taxes in the Czech
Republic versus 35 % in Romania) and spending on cash social transfers (12.5 % of GDP
compared to 9.2 % of GDP in Romania) (EUROSTAT).1
Since family benefits have been shown to be able to significantly influence poverty and
inequality (see Sect. 2), the large discrepancy in child poverty outcomes may partly be
explained by differences in child related public transfers. Obviously, children can be made
better off through a variety of public measures benefiting their families, ranging from
income transfers, to tax advantages and concession, to subsidies or in-kind provision of
goods and services.2 In this paper however, we limit our attention to transfers and tax
concessions directly linked to the presence of children. Using 2007 as our reference year,3
we isolate four4 policies in each of the two countries (three transfers and a tax concession)
which we collectively term the child support package and which will form the focus of our
analysis in the remainder of the paper. Table 1 provides an overview of the main policy
elements.
In 2007, Romania had three child related benefits. The first is a universal, flat-rate child
allowance that covers all children younger than eighteen and pays the same amount
irrespective of birth rank. There is however substantial age related variation. Children
under two benefit from an increased allowance approximately eight times higher than the
one available to older children. In fact, the level of the benefit for young children is
unusually high, representing approx. 16 % of the average gross wage in 2007. On average,
this benefit constitutes approximately 7 % of household disposable income for the families
that receive it. Low income families with children may be entitled to a supplementary
allowance. Entitlement is subject to passing an income test which is fairly stringent. The
benefit amount depends on the number of children present in the household. However, the
benefit increases less than proportionally for higher rank children and is capped after the
fourth child. Lone parent families are subject to the same income test but are entitled to
higher benefit rates. In total, approximately 40 % of children live in families receiving this
type of transfer. For households that receive it, the means-tested family allowance repre-
sents approximately 9 % of household disposable income. Finally, in 2007, Romania also
had a birth grant which was a lump sum payment to all new-borns equal to approximately
28 % of the average gross monthly wage (or 2 % of household disposable income for the
1 Figures refer to 2007 total government revenue and social benefits other than social transfers in kind.
2 A description of the tax-benefit system in Romania and the Czech Republic in 2007 (our policy year) can
be found in the respective EUROMOD country reports (Mu¨nich and Pavel 2012; Stroe et al. 2012).
3 While newer policy years were available in EUROMOD at the time this study started, we chose 2007 to
match it with the year of our dataset.
4 One important policy instrument that is missing from our analysis are maternal/parental leave benefits; we
have opted to exclude them in this case because they are only simulated in Romania.
S. Avram, E. Militaru
123
families that receive it). In addition to these transfers, families with children also qualify
for tax relief in the form of a tax allowance on employment income. The level of the tax
allowance is relatively low and its value is further decreased by the low rate of the personal
income tax. Receipt of the allowance is income tested and the amount decreases on a
sliding scale depending on the value of taxable earnings. Although the tax allowance is
available to all employed parents with low and moderately high employment incomes, only
69 % of children live in families that benefit from this allowance. For these families, the
gain due to the presence of the tax allowance represents approximately 2 % of household
disposable income.
In the Czech Republic, the main child benefit is income —tested. Receipt is restricted to
families with an income less than four times the family minimum living standard (MLS).
Nonetheless, the income conditionality is largely designed to exclude wealthy families
rather than restrict transfers to the poor. This aspect is confirmed by the fact that 74 % of
children receive this benefit (see Table 1). The benefit amount depends on the child’s age
(older children are entitled to increased payments) as well as on family income (families
with lower incomes are entitled to more generous rates). Overall, for recipient households,
the average benefit amount equals approximately 3 % of household disposable income. In
addition to the main child benefit, low income families may be entitled to an additional
income-tested transfer, called social allowance. As in the case of the main child benefit,
entitlement and benefit amounts are calculated using the family and child MLS levels.
However, eligibility is restricted to families with incomes below 2.2 times the family MLS
and any family income reduces the value of the benefit. Only 27 % of children live in
households receiving this benefit. On average, the benefit represents 6 % of disposable
income for the households that receive it. Similarly to Romania, the Czech Republic has a
lump-sum grant payable to all new-borns. However, unlike Romania, the benefit increases
with higher order births. It is also more generous than in Romania amounting to, on
average, 5 % of disposable income for the families that receive it. Lastly, families with
children are entitled to a refundable child tax credit. It is refundable only to parents with
Fig. 1 Child poverty rates in the EU, 2007. Note Children are defined as aged 17 or less. Source
EUROSTAT database, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
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sufficiently high employment income. The tax credit is the same for all children in the
family, irrespective of age and birth rank. Almost all children (90 %) benefit from it with
recipient households relying on it for approximately 3 % of their disposable income.
To sum up, the two child support packages are relatively similar. Both feature some
universalistic elements (the universal child benefit and the child tax allowance in Romania
and the child tax credit in the Czech Republic) together with some means-tested compo-
nents directed at families with few resources (the means-tested family benefit in Romania
and the social allowance in the Czech Republic). Means-testing is somewhat more
prevalent within the set of Czech policies. Yet, eligibility thresholds are high enough to
allow a significant number of families with children to become entitled.
4 Data and Methods
To examine the interaction between child policies, the tax-benefit system and population
characteristics, wemake extensive use ofmicrosimulation techniques to generate a number of
counterfactual scenarios (see the next section for a detailed overview).We then compare child
poverty measures under these difference scenarios. To carry out our simulations, we use
EUROMOD,5 the-EUwide tax-benefitmicrosimulationmodel (Sutherland and Figari 2013).
EUROMOD combines individual and household data from the EU-Survey of Income and
Living Conditions (EU-SILC) with detailed information on social and fiscal national legis-
lation to accurately simulate a wide range of transfer entitlements and tax liabilities at the
micro-level. We use the Romanian and Czech components of EUROMOD to simulate all
counterfactual scenarios. All our results refer to the policy year 2007 and use the 2008 EU-
SILC as the underlying micro data. As SILC 2008 contains income information corre-
sponding to the year 2007, there is no time discrepancy between our policy year and our data
year. All the simulations assume full compliance with taxes and full take-up of benefits.6 As a
result, simulation results refer to the intended rather than actual policy impacts.
We define children as individuals aged 17 or less, irrespective of their educational or
labour market status. Although children may be considered dependent (and thus entitled to
child related transfers and tax concessions) up to much older ages in both countries (subject
to additional conditions being staisfied), we have opted to circumvent potential incon-
gruities in the way children are defined across countries and across policy instruments by
restricting the age range.
Given our interest lies mainly in the anti-poverty potential of child related transfers and
tax concessions among families with children, we need to operationalize poverty. We
adopt the current established practice and define poverty in a relative way, based on
equivalised household disposable income. Disposable income is calculated as market
income plus public transfers minus taxes and social insurance contributions. We use the
%modified OECD’7 equivalence scale to account for differences in household size as well as
economies of scale in consumption. We assume income pooling across household
members and attribute equivalised disposable income to each individual, including
5 We use version G1.4.
6 We opt to assume 100 % compliance and take-up rates as there is very little information on which
modelling of tax evasion and/or benefit non-take-up can be based.
7 The modified OECD equaivalence scale assigns a weight of 1 for the first adult, 0.5 for all subsequent
adults and 0.3 for children. Children are defined as being aged 13 or less.
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children.8 Poverty is operationalized as having an equivalised disposable income lower
than 60 % of the median. To check the sensitivity of our results, we use a second, more
stringent, threshold set at 40 % of median equivalised disposable income. We use the term
severe poverty to denote poverty defined using the lower income threshold. In all cases, we
measure the impact of child related policies on a set of three poverty indicators belonging
to the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (FGT) family (Foster et al. 1984). More specifically, we
compute the relative reduction in the poverty rate (FGT0), gap (FGT1) and severity
(FGT2).
Finally, we conclude this section with two caveats. First, to keep the complexity of our
analysis manageable, we abstract from any behavioural changes triggered by replacing one
set of policies with another. From a policy perspective however, behavioural responses
clearly cannot be ignored. Second, we do not consider the issue of policy administration
costs. For example, it has long been acknowledged that administering targeted benefits is
much more burdensome compared to administering universal ones, albeit the difference
will depend on many factors such as the incentives to comply, the professionalization of
the service administering delivery etc.
5 Overview of Policy Scenarios
To quantify policy effects, most scholarly work compares poverty indicators using income
before and after the transfers that are of interest. For example, Table 2 shows poverty rates
and themean poverty gap for children usingmarket and social security replacement incomes9
(before transfers) as well as disposable income that includes all other transfers (after trans-
fers), including child related ones. Based on these figures, one may conclude that non-
contributory and means-tested benefits are more effective in reducing child poverty in the
Czech Republic compared to Romania, irrespective of which poverty indicator is used.What
this type of comparisons cannot tell us is the extent to which the Czech policies would be
similalry effective in a different context. More specifically, if the characteristics of the
population and/or the wider tax-benefit system in which they operate changed, would the
Czech policies still achieve the same impressive level of poverty reduction?
More generally, we are interested in the role and interconnections between three distinct
elements, namely population characteristics, the features of the tax-benefit system and the
policies contained in each country’s child support package. By population characteristics we
mean all individual or household characteristics that can affect tax liabilities or benefit enti-
tlements. They include demographic characteristics (e.g. age, household composition, gender),
labour market characteristics (e.g. employment status, hours worked, occupation) and all
market incomes. They also include a small number of transfers that are normally considered
part of the tax-benefit system but are not simulated by EUROMOD,10 most notably pensions.
These elements are taken directly from the underlying EUROMOD input datasets. In using the
8 This is an often made assumption despite it being innacurate. Some studies (Ward-Batts 2005; Lundberg
et al. 1997) have shown that public transfers received by the mother are more likely to be spent on children
invalidating the complete intrahousehold redistribution assumption. However, we ignore this issue in this
study.
9 Replacement incomes include pensions, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, maternity and parental
leave benefits.
10 Pensions and some smaller transfers such as sickness and maternity benefits are not simulated due to data
limitations in the EU-SILC.
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term ‘tax-benefit system’ we refer to sum of tax and benefit policies simulated in EUROMOD.
These include social insurance contributions, income tax, contributory unemployment benefits
as well as universal and means-tested transfers [see Mu¨nich and Pavel (2012); and Stroe et al.
(2012) for a complete description ofwhat is simulated inEUROMOD in each country]. Finally,
the child support package is the sum of the four child related policies described in Sect. 3, as
simulated by EUROMOD. To gain a better understanding of how each element affects the
others,we simulate all possible combinations betweenpopulation characteristics as capturedby
the data (Romanian and Czech), tax-benefit system (Romanian and Czech) and child policies
(Romanian and Czech—standard and budget neutral).
In each country, in addition to the existing systems in 2007,we simulate three types of policy
counterfactuals. To proxy for the income distribution that would be observed in the absence of
child related transfers (i.e. pre-transfer income), most research simply uses disposable income
minus these transfers. This approach assumes that all the other elements of the tax-benefit
systemwould remain unchanged once child related transfers are eliminated. This assumption is
however questionable as many elements of the tax-benefit system are income dependent. For
example, if child related transfers are included in the means-test of general social assistance,
removing child related transfers wouldmake some families eligible for higher social assistance
payments. These adjustments would be automatic. Thus, using disposable incomeminus child
related transfers to approximate the pre-transfer income distribution will usually overestimate
the impact of the child related policy package. To address this problem, in our first simulated
policy counterfactual, we remove the existing child support package and re-calculate dispos-
able incomes, allowing other elements of the tax-benefit system to react to the changed cir-
cumstances of previously eligible families. This scenario provides uswith a benchmark against
which all policy effects are measured. By comparing it with the original systems, we obtain the
net additional effect of the existing child support package on child poverty, conditional on the
original population characteristics and wider tax-benefit system.
In the second set of counterfactual scenarios, we introduce the other country’s child
related policies, adjusting the monetary parameters in two ways. In the standard policy
swap, we transform all monetary policy parameters (income limits, benefit amounts etc.)
based on the value of median equivalised disposable income.11 This allows us to mirror the
Table 2 Child poverty indicators before and after transfers
Child poverty rates (%) Child poverty gap (%)
60 % Of median
eq. DPI
40 % Of median
eq. DPI
60 % Of median
eq. DPI
40 % Of median
eq. DPI
Before
transfers
After
transfers
Before
transfers
After
transfers
Before
transfers
After
transfers
Before
transfers
After
transfers
RO 31.30 31.05 21.03 16.8 51.31 34.28 52.49 24.45
CZ 17.6 9.6 9.3 1.5 43.53 20.31 55.1 13.5
DPI disposable income; market incomes include replacement income from the tax-benefit system such as
pensions, sickness benefits, unemployment benefits etc
Source: Author’s calculations based on EU-SILC 2008 and EUROMOD G1.4
11 More specifically, we apply the following formula; new monetary parameter = old monetary parameter*
(median equivalised disposable income in the ‘‘receiver’’ country/median equivalised disposable income in
the ‘‘donor’’ country); for example when introducing Czech policies in Romania, the new policy parameters
in Romania will be = CZ policy parameter*(RO median equivalised household disposable income/CZ
median equivalised household disposable income).
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generosity of transfers and tax concessions relative to the poverty threshold. Subsequently,
we perform a budget-neutral swap where monetary parameters are calibrated so as to keep
total aggregate costs constant. Note that budget neutrality is imposed at the tax-benefit
system level rather than the child policy package level so as to take into account any
potential interactions with the other elements in the system.
Finally, we run the original policy system and the simulated counterfactuals using the
other country’s dataset as input. This allows us to understand the role of population
characteristics in determining the final policy impact we are interested in. To perform this
last set of simulations, incomes in the input datasets are adjusted based on the exchange
rate. We also construct a small number of variables needed for the simulations, replicating
as much as possible their construction in the other country’s dataset. Table 3 presents an
overview of all the simulated policy scenarios. Thus, we obtain 16 income distributions
that allow as to investigate interactions as follows.
First, we start by examining the impact of the child related package on child poverty in
the ‘usual’ way. We compare the percent reduction in child poverty indicators achieved by
Romanian policies in Romania [Scenario2 (S2) vs. Scenario 1 (S1)] and by Czech policies
in the Czech Republic (S14 vs. S13).
Second, to examine the extent to which the impact of child related policies depends on
population characteristics, we vary the underlying population while keeping the tax-benefit
system fixed. We first examine how the effect of Romanian child policies changes when
the characteristics of the population change. We thus compare the effect of the Romanian
child benefits (and tax concession) in the Romanian tax benefit system using first Roma-
nian data (S2 vs. S1) and then Czech data (S10 vs. S9). We repeat the same exercise for the
Czech child related policies (S3 vs S1 and S11 vs. S9). Finally, we examine the effect of
Romanian and Czech policies respectively in the Czech tax benefit system while using
Romanian (S7 vs. S5 and S6 vs. S5) and Czech data (S15 vs S13 and S14 vs S13).
Third, we examine the interaction between child support policies and other elements of
the tax-benefit system, given population characteristics. To this end, we keep the popu-
lation characteristics (i.e. data) fixed while we vary the tax-benefit system. We first look at
Table 3 Overview of simulated
scenarios
Source: Authors’ compilation
Scenario Data T-B system Child policies
1 RO RO None
2 RO RO RO
3 RO RO CZ (standard)
4 RO RO CZ (budget neutral)
5 RO CZ None
6 RO CZ CZ
7 RO CZ RO (standard)
8 RO CZ RO (budget neutral)
9 CZ RO None
10 CZ RO RO
11 CZ RO CZ (standard)
12 CZ RO CZ (budget neutral)
13 CZ CZ None
14 CZ CZ CZ
15 CZ CZ RO (standard)
16 CZ CZ RO (budget neutral)
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the extent to which the effect of the Romanian child policies on the Romanian population
is different when the policies are applied in conjunction with the Romanian tax-benefit
system (S2 vs. S1), and with the Czech tax-benefit system respectively (S7 vs. S5).
Similarly, we calculate the effect of the Romanian policies on the Czech data using first the
Romanian tax-benefit system (S10 vs S9) and then the Czech system (S15 vs S13). Finally,
we repeat the same set of calculations for the Czech policies, first examining their effect on
the Romanian population (S3 vs S1 and S6 vs S5) and then on the Czech population (S11
vs. S9 and S14 vs S13).
Fourth, we separate child poverty impacts stemming from benefit generosity from those
coming from policy design by comparing the effect of introducing the other country’s child
support package with monetary parameters adjusted relative to the poverty threshold and
relative to the budget size respectively.
Policy effects are calculated as the difference between poverty indicators relative to the
scenario when no child policies are present (keeping all the other elements constant). More
formally, policy effects are calculated as.
PE a; Popi; TBi; CPið Þ ¼ FGTa Popi; TBi; CP0ð Þ  FGTa Popi; TBi; CPið Þ
FGTa Popi; TBi; CP0ð Þ
where a = 0, 1, 2 is the FGT parameter; Pop = population characteristics; TB = tax-
benefit system; CP = child related policy package, with CP0 indicating that no child
related policies are present; i = CZ, RO.
6 Results
6.1 Interactions Between Policy Effects and Population Characteristics
Table 4 shows the effect of the child policy packages in the Czech Republic and Romania
under all data-tax-benefit system combinations. The ‘‘standard’’ approach in the literature
covering cross-national comparisons of policy effects is to compare the effect of the
policies in the environment from which they originated. In this case, one would compare
the effects of the Romanian policies in Romania (column A) with the effects of the Czech
policies in the Czech Republic (column H). In this setting, one can conclude that the Czech
child related policies are indeed much more effective at poverty reduction among families
with children, especially if the higher poverty threshold is chosen. For example, poverty
rates (using the higher poverty threshold) are reduced by approximately 38 % by the Czech
child related policies, whereas their Romanian counterparts achieve only a 14 % reduction.
However, this approach assumes that the policy effect is independent of population
characteristics and other policies being present.
To test the sensitivity of the child policy effects to population characteristics, one can
compare for example columns A and B. These show the effects of the Romanian child
policy package when applied to the Romanian population and to the Czech population
respectively. It is clear from Table 4 that the Romanian policies are much more effective in
reducing poverty among families with children when they are applied to the Czech pop-
ulation. For example, the reduction in the child poverty rates achieved in the context of the
Czech population is approximately three times as large as that achieved using the
Romanian population. Similalry, the reduction in the rate of severe poverty is more than
twice as large when Romanian policies are used with Czech data compared to when they
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are used with Romanian data. Similarily, the effect of the Czech child policies is much
lower when these policies are evaluated using Romanian data (columns G and H or
columns E and F). Clearly, population characteristics play a very important role in shaping
the impact of policies. Both the Romanian and Czech child support policies are much more
effective in reducing poverty and severe poverty when applied to the Czech population,
irrespective of the wider tax-benefit system. It appears that features of the Romanian
population make it harder to achieve poverty reduction for any set of policies aimed at
families with children. This aspect would not be captured if one were to compare policy
effects in the ‘‘standard’’ way (comparing columns A and H). More specifically, the much
larger anti-poverty effect of Czech child related policies is at least in part due to the
characteristics of the Czech population.
6.2 Interactions Between Policies and the tax Benefit System Given
Population Characteristics
Next, we examine the interactions between the child support packages available in the two
countries and the respective tax-benefit systems. We start with the effect of introducing the
Romanian child support policies into the Romanian and Czech policy systems respectively,
using first Romanian and then Czech data. As shown in Table 4, the anti-poverty effect of
the Romanian policies is somewhat stronger when they are introduced in the Romanian
tax-benefit system (columns A vs. C and B vs. D). This is true irrespective of using the
Romanian or the Czech datasets and concerns almost all poverty indicators. For example,
looking at Romanian policies severe child poverty is reduced by 27 % when introducing
the Romanian child support package in the Romanian system but only by 17 % when
introduced in the Czech system (columns A and C). Similarly, in the case of the Czech
Table 4 Anti-poverty effects of child related policies across tax-benefit contexts and populations
characteristics
Indicators Effect of RO policies Effect of CZ policies
A
S1–S2
B
S9–S10
C
S5–S7
D
S13–S15
E
S1–S3
F
S9–S11
G
S5–S6
H
S13–S14
RO TB sys CZ TB sys RO TB sys CZ TB sys
RO pop CZ pop RO pop CZ pop RO pop CZ pop RO pop CZ pop
Poverty—60 % of median income
FGT0 -13.86 -35.77 -11.04 -32.24 -15.72 -43.36 -7.84 -38.18
FGT1 -26.87 -46.49 -16.92 -33.81 -33.41 -56.78 -18.81 -38.20
FGT2 -35.47 -56.17 -22.11 -36.26 -44.20 -61.70 -26.41 -38.05
Severe poverty—40 % of median income
FGT0 -27.40 -69.18 -17.49 -38.80 -34.05 -74.64 -22.38 -36.15
FGT1 -41.15 -72.20 -23.14 -41.96 -52.78 -78.19 -29.01 -44.25
FGT2 -49.45 -76.94 -30.93 -41.01 -60.28 -81.75 -37.41 -43.70
All figures represent percentage reduction in the poverty indicators relative to the scenario when no child
related policies are present (keeping population and the tax-benefit system constant); all figures refer to
households with children. Each column shows which scenarios are being compared to derive policy effects
(ex: the effects in column A are derived as the reduction in poverty indicators between scenarios 1 and 2
relative to scenario 1 (S1–S2)/S1)
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROMOD G1.4
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children, severe child poverty is reduced by 69 % when policies are combined with the
Romanian tax-benefit system but only 39 % in combination with the Czech system (col-
umns B and D). A similar pattern is observed when analysing the poverty gap or the
poverty severity. For example, Romanian child related policies reduce the poverty gap by
41–72 % (depending on population characteristics) when introduced in the Romanian
system as opposed to 23–42 % when introduced in the Czech system.
The Czech child related transfers and tax concessions are also generating stronger
poverty reduction when used within the Romanian tax-benefit system. Table 4 illustrates
the reduction in child poverty indicators when introducing the Czech child-related policies
in the Romanian and Czech tax-benefit systems respectively. For example, using Romanian
data, poverty in households with children is reduced by 16 % when the policies are
introduced in the Romanian system but only by 8 % when introduced in the Czech system
(columns E and G). The difference in the effectiveness of the Czech policy bundle appears
even stronger when simulations are performed using Czech data. Again, although the
differences vary from indicator to indicator, generally, policies are more effective when
introduced within the Romanian tax-benefit system rather than the Czech one. To illustrate,
severe poverty among families with children is reduced by 75 % when pairing policies
with the Romanian system (column F). In contrast, introducing the policies within the
Czech system reduces severe poverty by around 36 % (column H).
To sum up, the Romanian tax-benefit system appears to magnify the anti-poverty effects
of child income support measures, regardless of population characteristics. Both the
Romanian and the Czech child related packages have enhanced effects when applied on top
of the Romanian tax-benefit rules. One possible explanation may be that, excluding child
related instruments, the Romanian tax-benefit system’s ability to reduce child poverty is
lower. As a result of the ineffectiveness of the other instruments in the Romanian tax-
benefit system, ‘more poverty’ is left to be dealt with by the child related instruments and
hence, the latter appear to be more effective.
6.3 Can Context Alter the Ranking of Policy Effects?
The anti-poverty effect of Romanian and Czech child related policies is highly dependent
on the context in which they operate. Both sets of policies are more effective when they
operate within the Romanian tax-benefit system and on the Czech population. However,
from a policy perspective, it is probably more interesting to find out which set of policies is
more effective while keeping the population characteristics and the overall features of the
tax-benefit system fixed. In the ‘‘standard’’ comparison where each set of child related
policies is assessed using the context where it originated from, Czech child related policies
appear to be more effective at reducing poverty among families with children compared to
Romanian policies (columns A and H). Whereas the precise level of achieved poverty
reduction may vary with population characteristics or the features of the tax-benefit system,
are Czech policies always more effective than the Romanian ones irrespective of context?
When assessing the two sets of policies in the context of the Romanian tax-benefit system,
the Czech child policies outperform the Romanian ones on almost all poverty indicators.
This result holds when inputting both Romanian (columns A vs. E) and Czech data
(columns B vs. F) into the simulated counterfactuals. Thus, given the characteristics of the
Romanian tax-benefit system and of the Romanian population, Czech policies are able to
effect greater poverty reduction among families with children.
However, when looking in the context of the Czech tax-benefit system, the performance
of the two sets of policy packages is very similar. This is the case both when policies are
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applied to the Romanian (columns C vs. G) and Czech populations (columns D vs. H). In
fact, the Romanian set of policies is more effective at reducing poverty rates, gap and
severity for some groups such as families with very young children (results not shown).
Thus, the context in which a policy operates can affect not only the absolute magnitude
of the estimated policy effects but can also, in some instances, reverse rankings. In our
case, the interaction between child related policies and the wider tax benefit system can
alter which set of policies is deemed more effective. In the context of the Romanian tax-
benefit system, Czech policies are more effective. However, in the context of Czech fiscal
and social rules, the two sets of policies generate similar anti-poverty effects, with the
Romanian package outperforming the Czech one on some indicators.
6.4 Generosity Versus Policy Design
The last issue we investigate is the role of policy design versus the generosity of the child
support package. Admittedly, the size of the transfers/tax concessions is a feature of the
policy, and thus could be considered as part of policy design. However, since budgetary
resources are not unlimited, it is useful to separate out policy effects due to simply
increased spending. For this purpose, in addition to our ‘standard’ policy swaps, we
simulate corresponding counterfactuals where all monetary parameters have been adjusted
so that the total spending equals the cost of the policies we are replacing (for similar
studies see Salanauskaite and Verbist 2013; Levy et al. 2009). Two things should be noted.
First, since we are simultaneously replacing four policies, there are potentially many
possibilities to obtain a budget neutral counterfactual. We solve this problem by adjusting
all the parameters by the same ratio. This strategy also has the advantage that it keeps the
relative sizes of the four policies we introduce equal to those in the original system.
Second, the budget neutrality is enforced at the tax-benefit system level, not at the policy
level. In taking this approach, we account for all budgetary effects generated by interac-
tions between the new policies and the rest of the fiscal and social rules. To give an
example, the introduction of more generous child benefits will increase the direct costs.
However, if these child benefits are taxable/included in the means-test of other benefits,
part of the increased costs will be offset by increased revenue/smaller outlays in other
policy areas.
Comparing standard and budget-neutral scenarios of the Czech policies in Romania, the
latter are clearly more effective in all dimensions (see Table 5). The differences are rather
large for all indicators, averaging around 10 percentage points. While the Czech system
relies on income-testing quite a lot, the Romanian one is more universalist with the result
that it is generally more expensive. Thus, swapping the Romanian child package for the
Czech one and adjusting the monetary parameters based on the values of the poverty
thresholds actually costs less. Therefore, to achieve budget neutrality, the parameters from
the ‘standard’ scenario need to be scaled up by 22 %. As a result, the child benefit package
is more generous in the budget neutral scenario and thus achieves better poverty reduction.
Coming back to results presented in Table 4, the Czech set of policies (in the ‘standard’
version) outperforms the Romanian one despite a lower budget.
Since the Romanian child package is generally more expensive, its parameters need to
be scaled down compared to the standard scenario to achieve budget neutrality. Indeed, the
adjustment factor is 0.62 indicating that the needed reduction is quite substantial. Based on
this downward adjustment, we would expect the budget neutral swap to perform worse
compared to the standard one. Indeed, this is the case when we look at poverty rates
defined using the higher income threshold. Nevertheless, differences are small despite the
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large correction factor. Moreover, both the poverty gap and poverty severity are better
mitigated in the budget neutral scenario, despite lowering amounts disbursed via child
benefits. In addition, all three poverty indicators show that severe poverty drops much
more dramatically in the budget neutral scenario compared with the standard swap. This
finding may seem counterintuitive. However, remember that budget neutrality is attained at
the system, not at the policy level. It is possible that lower outlays in the form of child
related transfers and tax deductions are compensated by increases in other elements of the
tax-benefit system. Indeed, disposable income in the first three deciles is virtually
unchanged between the two counterfactuals whereas the poverty line is higher (as
expected) in the standard scenario (results not shown). This finding highlights (again!) the
importance of policy interactions in shaping the overall effect. The capacity of the Czech
system in reaching the poor combined the untargeted nature of Romanian policies mean
that reducing the latter and increasing parts of the former may lead to better anti-poverty
results.
7 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper has examined the anti-poverty effect of child contingent policies in Romania
and the Czech Republic, paying particular attention to their sensitivity to population
characteristics and the wider tax-benefit system they are embedded in. We find that both
population characteristics and the other fiscal and social policies exert a substantial
influence on policy effects. For example, both the Romanian and the Czech child con-
tingent transfers are more effective when applied in the Romanian tax-benefit system. On
the other hand, when applied in the Czech tax-benefit system, both sets of policies have
similar effects. This suggests that the Czech tax-benefit system is effective on its own
(even in the absence of the child related policies) thus limiting any policy effects coming
from the policies themselves. Conversely, the Romanian tax-benefit system has a smaller
Table 5 Policy generosity versus policy design: anti-poverty effect of ‘standard’ versus budget neutral
policy swaps
Indicators RO policies in the CZ TB sys CZ policies in the RO TB sys
Standard S13–S15 Budget neutral S13–S16 Standard S1–S3 Budget neutral S1–S4
Poverty—60 % of median income
FGT0 -32.24 -26.58 -15.72 -21.42
FGT1 -33.81 -42.82 -33.41 -39.68
FGT2 -37.28 -54.28 -41.19 -51.21
Poverty—40 % of median income
FGT0 -38.80 -69.09 -34.05 -41.96
FGT1 -41.96 -78.65 -52.78 -61.07
FGT2 -41.01 -80.54 -58.93 -67.98
Policy effects have been computed relative to the scenario when no child related policies are present
(keeping population and the tax-benefit system constant); all figures refer to households with children. Each
column shows which scenarios are being compared to derive policy effects (ex: the effects in the first
column are derived as the reduction in poverty indicators between scenarios 15 and 13 relative to scenario
13 (S13-S15)/S13
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EUROMOD G1.4
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effect leaving more leeway for policies to have an impact. Thus, policy effects cannot
accurately be evaluated independent of the wider tax-benefit system in which they are
supposed to operate, as interactions with the other elements of the system are pervasive and
play a significant role in determining impact.
We find that quite apart from size, policy design matters on its own. As the case of the
Czech policies demonstrates, it is possible to achieve enhanced anti-poverty results on a
lower budget. Moreover, it is not clear that increasing the size of the transfers will always
lead to better poverty related outcomes. On the contrary, as shown in the case of the Czech
Republic, there may be substitution and trade-offs at the bottom of the income distribution
that are less likely to occur in the middle or at the top, especially if targeting is used
extensively. As a result, in the absence of co-ordination with other instruments, increased
spending on some transfers may be compensated by lower benefits/higher taxes in another
area.
Another consistent finding emerging from our analyses is the role of population char-
acteristics. Both the Romanian and the Czech policy packages achieve larger poverty
reduction when used together with the Czech population. In our setup, we cannot explicitly
disentangle which features of the Czech population are responsible for this result, but we
can hypothesize that the much lower inequality of market incomes in the Czech Republic
plays a role. If this is the case, it suggests that poverty mitigation is likely to be much
harder when the incomes of the poor and the rich are far apart regardless of what transfer
instruments are in place. It may thus be more efficient for public policies to focus on
limiting inequality of market incomes in the first place (through such measures as acti-
vation policies, minimum wage setting, steep taxation of very high incomes to discourage
their occurrence etc.) rather than trying to direct more resources to the poor via transfers.
Overall, our results point to the importance of interactions between the various policy
instruments operating within the same system, as well as to complex linkages between
population characteristics and policy design. In principle, the effect of a given set of
policies in a particular context cannot be inferred from the effect of the same set of policies
in a different context. Unfortunately, these complexities make policy benchmarking and
policy learning all the more difficult. What seems to be working very well in one context
may not work in another. EU-wide policy reviews recognize these issues explicitly or
implicitly when they recommend an ‘appropriate policy mix’ (TARKI 2010). However,
what an ‘appropriate policy mix’ should contain still eludes us. Future research should
focus on disentangling which population and system characteristics ‘fit’ with which types
of policies.
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Appendix: Parameters of the Child Related Policies
See Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6 Romanian child related policies
RO policies in RO system
(S2 and S10)
RO policies in CZ
system-standard (S7 and
S15)
RO policies in CZ
system- budget neutral
(S8 and S16)
Universal child
benefit-amounts
200 RON/month if
age\ 2; 25
RON/month if age C
and age\ 18
5628 CZK/month if
age\ 2; 704
CZK/month if age C 2
and age\ 18
3489 CZK/month if
age\ 2; 436.5
CZK/month if age C 2
and age\ 18
Universal birth grant-
amount
150 RON/year if
age = 0; in addition,
204 RON/year if
age = 0 and total
number of children B4
4221 CZK/year if
age = 0; in addition,
5721 CZK/year if
age = 0 and total
number of children B4
2617 CZK/year if
age = 0; in addition,
3547 CZK/year if
age = 0 and total
number of children B4
Means-tested family
benefit -threshold
176 RON/per month per
person
4953 CZK per month per
person
3071 CZK per month per
person
Means-tested family
benefit-amounts
Between 36 and 79 RON
per month, depending
on number of children
and type of household
Between 1013 and 2223
CZK per month
depending on number
of children and type of
household
Between 628 and 1378
CZK per month
depending on number
of children and type of
household
Tax allowance for
dependent
children-eligibility
Employment income
below 3000
RON/month; tax
allowance starts being
reduced when
employment income
surpasses 1000
RON/month
Employment income
below 84,446
CZK/month; tax
allowance starts being
reduced when
employment income
surpasses 28,142
CZK/month
Employment income
below 52,357
CZK/month; tax
allowance starts being
reduced when
employment income
surpasses 17,448
CZK/month
Tax allowance for
dependent
children-eligibility
100 RON/month 2814 CZK/month 1745 CZK/month
1 RON = approx. 5.60 CZK (according to June 2007 exchange rates); simulations to which the parameters
apply in parentheses
Source: EUROMOD G1.4; the conversion of the parameters has been made by multiplying the values in the
Romanian system by median household disposable income in CZ/median household disposable income in
RO
Table 7 Czech child related policies
CZ policies in the CZ
system (S6 and S14)
CZ policies in the RO
system-standard (S3 and
S11)
CZ policies in the RO
system- budget neutral
(S4 and S12)
Means-tested child
allowance-
minimum living
standard-adults
Between 2600 and 3126
CZK/month depending
on the type of household
Between 92 and 111
RON/month depending
on the type of
household
Between 112 and 135
RON/month depending
on the type of
household
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